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\* Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of De Nederlandsche Bank.

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# Liquidity Stress Detection in the European Banking Sector \*

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**Abstract:** Liquidity stress constitutes an ongoing threat to financial stability in the banking sector. A bank that manages its liquidity inadequately might find itself unable to meet its payment obligations. These liquidity issues, in turn, can negatively impact the liquidity position of many other banks due to contagion effects. For this reason, central banks carefully monitor the payment activities of banks in financial market infrastructures and try to detect early-warning signs of liquidity stress. In this paper, we investigate whether this monitoring task can be performed by supervised machine learning. We construct probabilistic classifiers that estimate the probability that a bank faces liquidity stress. The classifiers are trained on a dataset consisting of various payment features of European banks and which spans several known stress events. Our experimental results show that the classifiers detect the periods in which the banks faced liquidity stress reasonably well.

**Keywords:** Risk Monitoring, Liquidity Stress, Neural Networks, Financial Market Infrastructures, Large-Value Payment Systems

**JEL Codes:** G32, G33, C45, E42

## 1 Introduction

It is the nature of banks to attract deposits and provide loans. The maturity mismatch of short-term deposits versus long-term loans makes banks vulnerable to liquidity risk. Liquidity risk is "the risk that a firm will not be able to meet efficiently both expected and unexpected current and future cash flow and collateral needs" (BIS, 2008). When a bank does not manage its liquidity adequately, it might find itself unable to fulfill its short-term payment obligations and face bankruptcy. These liquidity issues, in turn, can spread across a payment system and affect the liquidity position of many other banks. For this reason, central banks closely monitor the payment activities of banks and try to anticipate early signs of liquidity stress.

In recent years, the payment data generated by Financial Market Infrastructures (FMIs) has become an important new source to detect liquidity risks. FMIs are often called the financial backbone of our modern society. Their main purpose is to facilitate the clearing, settlement, and recording of monetary and other financial transactions. The most important FMIs are

the Large-Value Payment Systems (LVPSs) which are developed and maintained by central banks to process high-value payments and administer monetary policy. The transaction log generated by such systems provides detailed insight into the payment behavior of banks and can be analyzed to detect cases where banks manage their liquidity in an unsafe manner.

Several unsupervised methods have been proposed for this purpose based on traditional statistics, see e.g. (Heijmans and Heuver, 2014), and unsupervised machine learning, see e.g. (Triepels et al., 2018). The idea behind these methods is to derive the patterns by which banks usually manage their liquidity from the transaction log of an LVPS and search for cases where the current payment behavior of banks deviates from their expected patterns. Such anomalies can be due to a bank facing liquidity stress which forces it to change its payment behavior.

However, a drawback of these unsupervised methods is that it can be difficult to determine what kind of patterns are learned about the payment behavior of banks. In addition, when there is a significant deviation between the expected and current payment behavior of a bank, it is often not clear whether this deviation is due to the bank facing liquidity stress or whether the bank needs to pay some unusual one-time payments that do not pose a real threat to its liquidity

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position on the long-term.

This paper aims to investigate whether liquidity stress at banks can also be detected by supervised machine learning. In supervised machine learning, a model is trained from a labeled training set containing explicit examples of the output to be predicted. A supervised machine learning model can be trained to detect whether a bank is likely facing liquidity stress by learning the patterns that are characteristic for a stressed and non-stressed bank. These patterns can be derived from historical labeled payment data of a pre-selected set of banks that faced known stress events such as a takeover or bank run.

There are two main challenges to make this supervised method work in practice. First, stress events at banks are quite rare and typically last for only a few days which makes it difficult to learn the patterns of a stressed bank. Second, there is currently not much data recorded about stress events at banks, and such data is difficult to obtain.

In this paper, we show how these challenges can be addressed. We construct several probabilistic classifiers that estimate the probability that a bank faces liquidity stress. The classifiers are trained on a dataset that describes the payment behavior of several European banks over the past ten years. We elaborate on how to deal with the imbalance between stress and non-stress examples by training the classifiers based on a weighted loss function. Furthermore, we discuss how we labeled the dataset by searching online for news articles about stress events at the banks. Although the quality of the stress classes is not ideal, we will show that the classifiers detect liquidity stress reasonably well.

## 2 Related Research

Many papers have studied the problem of predicting the emergence of a financial crisis in a country. Financial crises are predicted from historical panel data consisting of macroeconomic variables such as the GDP growth rate of a country. Traditionally, this has been done by a logit model (Demirg-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998) or by the signal extraction method of (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). An extensive comparison of these two methods can be found in (Davis and Karim, 2008). More recent papers have also explored how machine learning can be applied to predict financial crises. For example, (Chamon et al., 2007) applied a random forest to predict the emergence of a capital account crisis based on a wide range of macroeconomic features categorized by four sectors (external, fiscal, financial, and corporate). Moreover,

(Fioramanti, 2008) constructed a multi-layer perceptron network to predict the emergence of a sovereign debt crisis based on a large set of internal, external, and debt related features of a country.

There are also many papers that have studied the problem of predicting how well a bank performs. This problem is called bank performance prediction. Typically, the performance of a bank is predicted from financial ratios that are derived from the financial statements of banks such as their balance sheets. Early papers on this topic predict bank performance based on statistical methods such as discriminant analysis, see (Beaver, 1966; Altman, 1968). In recent years, machine learning is also becoming increasingly popular in this research area. Several machine learning techniques have been applied to perform bank performance prediction including neural networks (Tam, 1991) and support-vector machines (Min and Lee, 2005). An extensive overview of these techniques can be found in (Kumar and Ravi, 2007).

The problem studied in this paper is similar to bank performance prediction. However, we predict stress at banks based on features derived from the payment data generated by FMIs. We call this problem liquidity stress detection. The use of payment data has some advantages over financial statements. Unlike financial statements, payment data can be made available in near real-time, provides detailed insight into the liquidity management of banks, and cannot be easily manipulated (e.g. by window dressing).

## 3 Liquidity Stress Detection

In this section, we formalize the problem of liquidity stress detection (section 3.1 until 3.3). Furthermore, we discuss how this problem can be solved by a logistic regression model (section 3.4) and multi-layer perceptron network (section 3.5).

### 3.1 Notation

Let  $\mathcal{B} = \{b_1, \dots, b_n\}$  be a set of  $n$  banks and  $\mathcal{T} = \{t_1, \dots, t_l\}$  a set of  $l$  time intervals. The time intervals are consecutive, equally spaced, and collectively span the operating time of the financial system (e.g. by days or hours). Furthermore, let:

$$\mathbf{x}_i^{(k)} = [x_{i1}^{(k)}, \dots, x_{im}^{(k)}]^T \quad (1)$$

be a column vector of  $m$  payment features of bank  $b_k$  at time interval  $t_i$ . Each feature vector describes the payment behavior of a bank at a particular time interval and includes features related to the bank's liquidity position, payment flows, and collateral. We de-

note the set of all feature vectors by  $\mathcal{X}$ . Finally, let  $y_i^{(k)} \in \{0, 1\}$  be the stress class that indicates whether bank  $b_k$  faces liquidity stress at time interval  $t_i$ .

### 3.2 Classification Problem

Our goal is to construct a probabilistic classifier that classifies a feature vector by whether or not the corresponding bank faces liquidity stress. We can define this classifier as a probability function:

$$f : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow [0, 1] \quad (2)$$

where:

$$f(\mathbf{x}_i^{(k)}) = P(y_i^{(k)} = 1 | \mathbf{x}_i^{(k)}) \quad (3)$$

is the conditional probability that bank  $b_k$  faces liquidity stress given that we observe feature vector  $\mathbf{x}_i^{(k)}$  at time interval  $t_i$ . A bank is classified as facing liquidity stress if  $f(\mathbf{x}_i^{(k)})$  is high, i.e.:

$$\phi(\mathbf{x}_i^{(k)}, \zeta) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } f(\mathbf{x}_i^{(k)}) \geq \zeta \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

Here,  $\zeta \in [0, 1]$  is a threshold close to one that determines how confident the classifier needs to be to classify a feature vector as belonging to a stressed bank.

### 3.3 Model Assumptions

Throughout this paper, we consider the case of estimating  $f$  under the following two assumptions:

1. Payment features and stress classes are independent of each bank, i.e.  $(\mathbf{x}_i^{(a)}, y_i^{(a)})$  is independent of  $(\mathbf{x}_i^{(b)}, y_i^{(b)})$  for each time interval  $t_i \in \mathcal{T}$  and  $a \neq b$ .
2. Payment features and stress classes are time invariant, i.e.  $(\mathbf{x}_a^{(k)}, y_a^{(k)})$  is independent of  $(\mathbf{x}_b^{(k)}, y_b^{(k)})$  for each bank  $b_k \in \mathcal{B}$  and  $a \neq b$ .

These assumptions do not hold in practice but greatly simplify the detection of liquidity stress. It is well known that liquidity issues can spread across banks by contagion effects. Moreover, a bank that is currently facing liquidity stress has a higher probability to be also stressed in the next time intervals since liquidity issues can take quite some time before they are resolved. We will show that, even by making these strong simplifications, we can detect liquidity stress quite well.

Not every classifier is suitable to estimate  $f$ . We want a classifier that produces well-calibrated probabilities and can deal with severely imbalanced data.

In our experiments, the probability of a feature vector belonging to a stressed bank was less than 0.1 percent. Such severely imbalanced data harms the performance of many classifiers. A logistic regression model or multi-layer perceptron network is particularly suited to estimate  $f$ . Both types of models are probabilistic and have found to produce well-calibrated probabilities in practice (Niculescu-Mizil and Caruana, 2005). Moreover, they can be easily adapted to deal with unbalanced data.

### 3.4 Logistic Regression

Logistic Regression (LR) is a simple probabilistic binary classifier. It is an extension of multiple linear regression to the case where the response variable of the regression model is a binary variable.

We consider the following LR model to detect liquidity stress:

$$\hat{y}_i^{(k)} = \sigma(\mathbf{w}\mathbf{x}_i^{(k)} + b) \quad (5)$$

where,  $\mathbf{w}$  is a  $m$ -dimensional row vector of weights,  $b$  is a bias term, and  $\sigma$  is the sigmoid function:

$$\sigma(x) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-x}} \quad (6)$$

The sigmoid function in equation 5 rescales the linear combination to the range  $(0, 1)$ . The output  $\hat{y}_i^{(k)}$  is an estimate of  $f(\mathbf{x}_i^{(k)})$ .

### 3.5 Multi-Layer Perceptron

A Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) network is a type of feed-forward neural network. It is similar to an LR model with the exception that it processes input features through one or more hidden layers consisting of non-linear computational units. These additional hidden layers enable the MLP network to learn a non-linear mapping from its inputs to its outputs.

We focus on an MLP network consisting of multiple hidden layers and a single sigmoid output. Let  $\delta$  be the number of layers or depth of the network and  $s_i$  the size of the  $i$ -th layer. We denote the output of the  $i$ -th layer by  $\mathbf{h}_i$ . The first layer of the network is the input layer, and the output of this layer is the feature vector that is presented to the network:

$$\mathbf{h}_1 = \mathbf{x}_i^{(k)} \quad (7)$$

The input is processed through the hidden layers. The output of the  $i$ -th layer is:

$$\mathbf{h}_i = \psi^{(s_i)}(\mathbf{W}_i \mathbf{h}_{i-1} + \mathbf{b}_i) \quad \text{for } 1 < i < \delta \quad (8)$$

where,  $\mathbf{W}_i$  is a  $s_i$  by  $s_{i-1}$  matrix of weights,  $\mathbf{b}_i$  is a  $s_i$ -dimensional column vector of bias terms, and  $\psi^{(s_i)}(\mathbf{x})$  is a set of  $s_i$  non-linear activation functions that are applied to each element of  $\mathbf{x}$ . Usually,  $\psi$  is taken to be the hyperbolic tanh function (LeCun et al., 1998) or rectified linear function (Glorot et al., 2011). Finally, the output of the last hidden layer  $\mathbf{h}_{\delta-1}$  is processed through a single sigmoid unit:

$$\hat{y} = \mathbf{h}_{\delta} = \sigma(\mathbf{w}_{\delta}\mathbf{h}_{\delta-1} + b_{\delta}) \quad (9)$$

where  $\mathbf{w}_{\delta}$  is a  $s_{\delta}$ -dimensional row vector of weights and  $b$  is a bias term. The output  $\mathbf{h}_{\delta}$  of the final layer is an estimate of  $f(\mathbf{x}_i^{(k)})$ .

### 3.6 Model Estimation

The parameters of the LR model and MLP network can be estimated from a historical dataset of features vectors with known stress classes. Let  $\Theta$  be the set of parameters to be optimized. Moreover, let  $\mathcal{D} = \{d_1, d_2, \dots\}$  be a dataset of tuples where each tuple:

$$d_j = (\mathbf{x}_i^{(k)}, y_i^{(k)}) \quad (10)$$

consists of a feature vector  $\mathbf{x}_i^{(k)}$  and corresponding stress class  $y_i^{(k)}$ . We find optimal values for the parameters by minimizing the mean cross entropy. The cross entropy of a single feature vector is:

$$\mathcal{J}(\mathbf{x}_i^{(k)}, y_i^{(k)}) = -y_i^{(k)} \log \hat{y}_i^{(k)} \quad (11)$$

$$- (1 - y_i^{(k)}) \log(1 - \hat{y}_i^{(k)}) \quad (12)$$

The cross entropy averaged over all feature vectors in  $\mathcal{D}$  is:

$$\mathcal{J}(\mathcal{D}) = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}|} \sum_{d \in \mathcal{D}} \mathcal{J}(\mathbf{x}_i^{(k)}, y_i^{(k)}) \quad (13)$$

The optimal values of the parameters are found by solving the following optimization problem:

$$\Theta^* = \arg \min_{\Theta} \mathcal{J}(\mathcal{D}) \quad (14)$$

Usually, such a problem is solved by gradient-based optimization in conjunction with back-propagation (Werbos, 1982; Bottou, 2004).

However, an issue in our application is that the stress classes are highly imbalanced which makes it difficult to solve equation 14 by gradient-based optimization. One way to deal with this issue is to optimize a weighted version of cross entropy which also takes into account the probability of a feature vector belonging to a stressed bank. The weighted cross entropy of a single feature vector is:

$$\mathcal{J}'(\mathbf{x}_i^{(k)}, y_i^{(k)}) = -ay_i^{(k)} \log \hat{y}_i^{(k)} \quad (15)$$

$$- (1 - a)(1 - y_i^{(k)}) \log(1 - \hat{y}_i^{(k)}) \quad (16)$$

where  $a \in (0, 1)$  is the importance that we assign to predicting the stress class correct. We set  $a$  equal to the probability that a feature vector does not belong to a stressed bank. In this way, when there are fewer stress examples in the dataset, there is a higher incentive for the classifiers to assign a high probability to the stress examples.

## 4 Experimental Setup

In this section, we elaborate on a series of experiments that were conducted to determine how well the LR model and MLP network detect liquidity stress in real-world data. We discuss the characteristics of the data (section 4.1 until 4.4), the implementation of the classifiers (section 4.5), and the performance evaluation procedure (section 4.6).

### 4.1 Data Sources and Features

We created a dataset of feature vectors which describes the payment behavior of all European banks on a daily basis over the last ten years. It is compiled from data generated by three important FMIs of the Eurosystem: its large-value payment system called TARGET2<sup>2</sup>, collateral management system, and minimum reserve system.

The majority of features were derived from TARGET2. Based on the transaction log of this payment system, we calculated for each bank its:

- Daily net value of payments (i.e. total inflow minus total outflow)
- Daily net number of transactions (i.e. total number of incoming payments minus total number of outgoing payments)
- Daily net payment time within the day weighted by value (i.e. the weighted payment time of incoming payments minus the weighted payment time of outgoing payments)
- Daily net payment time within the day weighted by the number of transactions (i.e. the weighted payment time of incoming payments minus the weighted payment time of outgoing payments)

<sup>2</sup>More information about TARGET2 can be found in (ECB, 2018).

These payment features were calculated for each payment type separately. Each payment settled in TARGET2 has an associated type that describes the nature of the payment, e.g. a customer payment, inter-bank payment, or administrative payment. Furthermore, we calculated for each bank its:

- Daily end-of-day account balance
- Daily minimum account balance (i.e. the lowest value within the day)

We also derived features that describe the activities of the banks on the interbank money market. To derive these features, we applied the Furfine algorithm (Furfine, 1999) on the transaction log of TARGET2 to classify each transaction as a regular transaction or money market transaction<sup>3</sup>. Accordingly, based on the subset of money market transactions, we calculated for each bank its:

- Daily number of money market counterparties
- Daily HHI-index (Hirschman, 1945) of money market counterparties weighted by the value of the money market loans
- Daily spread of the weighted borrowing rate to EONIA (i.e. the difference between the money market rate of the bank and the EONIA)

These money-market features were calculated for the case in which a bank is the lender as well as the borrower in a money-market transaction.

Besides the payment features and money-market features, we also derived features from the European collateral management system. This system records the amount of collateral European banks have deposited at the Eurosystem and how much of this collateral is available for banks to make payments during the day. From collateral data of this system, we calculated for each bank its:

- Daily average haircut on all collateral
- Daily value of collateral before the haircut
- Daily value of collateral after the haircut

Banks cannot use collateral within the Eurosystem at the market value. Instead, the value of collateral is decreased by a certain percentage to account for potential credit risk that the European Central Bank could face should a bank default and its collateral needs to be sold. This percentage is called the haircut.

Finally, we derived data about the minimum reserve requirement of each bank from the European

<sup>3</sup>See (Arciero et al., 2016) for more information on how the Furfine algorithm can be applied to identify money market transactions in the transaction log of TARGET2.

minimum reserve system. The minimum reserve requirement is the average amount of liquidity that a bank must keep on its settlement accounts during the maintenance period. Based on this data and the transaction data of TARGET2, we calculated for each bank the relative difference between its end-of-day balance and its minimum reserve requirement.

## 4.2 Data Normalization

However, a problem with the features is that they each are on a different scale. In addition, the range of each feature depends on the type of bank (e.g. small or large) for which it is calculated. Hence, we cannot easily compare the feature vectors of one bank with the feature vectors of another bank.

To address this issue, we re-scaled the feature vectors of each bank separately by z-normalization. The normalized value of a feature was calculated by:

$$\tilde{x}_{ij}^{(k)} = \frac{x_{ij}^{(k)} - \bar{x}_j^{(k)}}{s_j^{(k)}} \quad (17)$$

where,  $\bar{x}_j^{(k)}$  and  $s_j^{(k)}$  are respectively the sample mean and standard deviation of the  $j$ -th feature in a feature vector estimated for bank  $b_k$ . Normalized feature  $\tilde{x}_{ij}^{(k)}$  represents the number of standard deviations  $x_{ij}^{(k)}$  deviates from the mean  $\bar{x}_j^{(k)}$  of bank  $b_k$ . Notice that, after performing this normalization, the features of each bank have zero mean and unit variance.

## 4.3 Stress Classes

Obtaining data about the periods in which banks faced liquidity stress is difficult. A good indicator of liquidity stress is when a bank requests emergency liquidity assistance. When a bank faces liquidity stress, it can turn to the central bank that acts as a lender of last resort and request liquidity in exchange for collateral of lesser quality. Although data about the use of emergency liquidity by European banks is recorded, we were not able to obtain it because such data is highly confidential and could not be made available for research purposes.

Instead, we obtained the stress classes by performing an online news analysis. We asked payment experts in the Eurosystem which banks suffered from severe liquidity stress recently. The experts provided us with a short-list of seven banks<sup>4</sup>. For each bank on

<sup>4</sup>Because of confidentiality reasons, we cannot disclose the names of these banks. Instead, we will refer to the banks by letter, i.e. bank A, bank B, and so on.

this list, we searched for evidence of liquidity stress on Wikipedia and in online news articles of several national and international financial newspapers (e.g. the Financial Times). All noteworthy events that we found about the banks that could indicate possible liquidity stress were organized in a detailed timeline.

Based on the timeline, we assigned the feature vector of each bank at each day in the analysis period to one of the following stress codes:

1. No stress - if we could not find any evidence of liquidity stress at the bank at the given day
2. Possibly stress - if we could find some evidence of liquidity stress at the bank at the given day but which was not that severe (e.g. shares of the bank dropped or a staff member had been fired)
3. Stress - if we could find clear evidence of liquidity stress at the bank at the given day (e.g. the start of a bank run or rumors of a takeover)
4. Bankrupt - if the bank is no longer operating and only participates in the financial system for administrative reasons

In most cases, the stress codes of the banks started at 1 (no stress) and incrementally increased over time to stress code 4 (bankrupt).

Finally, the feature vectors were labeled based on the stress codes. Feature vectors with stress code 1 (no stress) were assigned the no stress class and feature vectors with stress code 3 (stress) were assigned the stress class. No stress class was assigned to the feature vectors with stress code 2 (possibly stress) and stress code 4 (bankrupt). These unlabeled feature vectors were not used for model training but only for out-of-sample prediction.

#### 4.4 Data Partitioning

We performed a series of experiments to determine how well liquidity stress at the banks can be detected out-of-sample. During each experiment, the dataset was partitioned into a separate training set and test set. A classifier was trained on the training set which contained the feature vectors of all banks except for one bank. The feature vectors of this holdout bank were put in the test set and used to evaluate how well the classifier performs. We repeated this experiment seven times such that the feature vectors of each bank were used exactly once for testing. Accordingly, we measured the average performance of the classifier over the experiments. Figure 1 provides a schematic overview of the experiments.

#### 4.5 Model Implementation

We trained the LR model described in section 3.4 and two variations of the MLP network described in section 3.5 on each training set. The MLP networks have one hidden layer with either a hyperbolic tangent activation or rectifier linear activation. We will refer to these networks as MLP1 and MLP2 respectively. All classifiers were optimized by stochastic gradient descent with momentum and mini-batches. This procedure was performed for a fixed number of epochs with a constant learning rate. To avoid over-fitting, we applied L2 weight decay (Krogh and Hertz, 1992) on all weights of the MLP networks.

The MLP networks have some hyper-parameters that needed to be tuned. These parameters include the number of units in the hidden layer and the amount of weight decay. We optimized these parameters by a variation of  $k$ -fold cross-validation using R package caret (Kuhn, 2008). During the validation procedure, the training set was partitioned in six folds that each contained the feature vectors of a particular bank. An MLP network was trained on five of the folds having a particular configuration of hidden units and weight decay. Accordingly, the loss function of the network was evaluated on the holdout fold. This process was repeated until each configuration of parameters was evaluated once on each fold. Finally, we choose the configuration for which the network achieved the lowest loss averaged over all holdout folds.

#### 4.6 Evaluation Metrics

The performance of each classifier was evaluated by calculating its precision, recall and  $F_1$ -score on each test set. For a given threshold  $\zeta$ , precision is the probability that a feature vector belongs to a stressed bank given that a classifier predicted liquidity stress:

$$\text{Precision}(\zeta) = P(y_i^{(k)} = 1 | \hat{y}_i^{(k)} \geq \zeta) \quad (18)$$

In contrast, recall is the probability that a classifier predicts liquidity stress given that a feature vector belongs to a stressed bank:

$$\text{Recall}(\zeta) = P(\hat{y}_i^{(k)} \geq \zeta | y_i^{(k)} = 1) \quad (19)$$

The  $F_1$ -score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall:

$$F_1(\zeta) = 2 \cdot \frac{\text{Precision}(\zeta) \cdot \text{Recall}(\zeta)}{\text{Precision}(\zeta) + \text{Recall}(\zeta)} \quad (20)$$

It constitutes an overall measure to compare the performance of a set of competing classifiers. We determined the classifier that achieved the highest  $F_1$ -score averaged over all test sets.



Figure 1: The partitioning of the dataset during the experiments. In each experiment, the dataset was partitioned in a training set and test set. Accordingly, the training set was further partitioned in six cross-validation folds. The test set and the cross-validation folds each contained only the feature vectors of a particular bank. The experiments were repeated such that the feature vectors of each bank are used exactly once for testing.

	Bank A	Bank B	...	Bank F	Bank G
Experiment 1	Test	Train / Fold 1	...	Train / Fold 5	Train / Fold 6
Experiment 2	Train / Fold 1	Test	...	Train / Fold 5	Train / Fold 6
⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮
Experiment 6	Train / Fold 1	Train / Fold 2	...	Test	Train / Fold 6
Experiment 7	Train / Fold 1	Train / Fold 2	...	Train / Fold 6	Test

## 5 Results

Table 1 shows the performance evaluation of the classifiers in case they are trained by regular cross entropy. The results for weighted cross entropy are shown in Table 2. A threshold of  $\zeta = 0.9$  was used in all experiments. This means that the classifiers raised an alarm when they were at least 90% sure that a bank was facing liquidity stress.

A few things stand out in these tables. We see that the classifiers detect liquidity stress much better when they are trained by weighted cross entropy. The average  $F_1$ -score of the models increases when they are trained by weighted cross entropy instead of cross entropy. This increase can be attributed to the fact that weighted cross entropy incentivizes the models more to assign a high probability to the stress cases.

Moreover, we see that MLP2 detects liquidity stress overall the best. The network achieves an average  $F_1$ -score of 0.42 with an average precision of 70% and average recall of 34%. These measures imply that more than two-thirds of all alarms generated by the network were correct and the network detected more than one-third of all stress cases. The LR model achieved a similar  $F_1$ -score but generated alarms for liquidity stress with much lower precision.

The break-down of the performance metrics by bank in Table 1 and 2 also shows that the classifiers do not perform well on every bank. In particular, they have difficulties detecting liquidity stress at bank A and C. We suspect that the classifiers do not perform well on these banks because the stress classes of these banks are of poor quality. Our news analysis provides only a rough approximation of the level of stress that

banks experience. News items can be incorrect, imprecise, or incomplete. Also, many stress events do not become known to the general public or cannot be observed in payment data. All these factors could have caused the wrong stress class being assigned to the feature vectors of these banks.

Another factor that negatively impacts the performance of the classifiers is the relatively small training sets on which they were trained. There are many forms of liquidity stress that a bank can face. For example, a bank can face liquidity problems for only a few days which results in a bank-run or face long-term solvency issues that eventually lead to a state takeover. It is unlikely that the classifiers were able to learn to recognize all these different forms of stress from data of only seven stressed banks.

We also determined whether the classifiers detect liquidity stress before the stress became known to the general public. This was done, similarly as in the performance evaluation, by classifying out-of-sample the feature vectors of a holdout bank. However, this time, we also classified the features vectors that are assigned stress code 2 (possibly stress) by our news analysis. If the classifiers assign these feature vectors to the stress class, then they likely pick up an early-warning sign of liquidity stress.

Figure 2 depicts the out-of-sample predictions of a bank. It shows that the classifier detects an early sign of liquidity stress in the 'possibly stress' period, quite some time before the stress became publicly known in the 'stress' period. We checked whether we could find the same stress sign by the method of (Heijmans and Heuver, 2014), i.e. by studying simple plots of the features one-at-a-time, but were unable to spot any

Table 1: The precision, recall, and  $F_1$ -score of the classifiers in case they are trained based on regular cross entropy. In all experiments, a threshold of  $\zeta = 0.9$  was used to generate alarms for liquidity stress.

$\zeta = 0.9$	Precision			Recall			$F_1$		
	LR	MLP1	MLP2	LR	MLP1	MLP2	LR	MLP1	MLP2
Bank A	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Bank B	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Bank C	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.00	0.00	0.40	0.00	0.00
Bank D	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.33	0.33	0.33
Bank E	0.80	0.00	1.00	0.09	0.00	0.09	0.16	0.00	0.16
Bank F	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.40	0.10	0.30	0.57	0.18	0.46
Bank G	0.80	0.83	1.00	0.40	0.50	0.40	0.53	0.63	0.57
Average	0.66	0.40	0.57	0.19	0.11	0.14	0.28	0.16	0.22

Table 2: The precision, recall, and  $F_1$ -score of the classifiers in case they are trained based on weighted cross entropy. In all experiments, a threshold of  $\zeta = 0.9$  was used to generate alarms for liquidity stress.

$\zeta = 0.9$	Precision			Recall			$F_1$		
	LR	MLP1	MLP2	LR	MLP1	MLP2	LR	MLP1	MLP2
Bank A	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00
Bank B	0.67	1.00	1.00	0.40	0.40	0.20	0.50	0.57	0.33
Bank C	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Bank D	0.33	0.50	1.00	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.25	0.29	0.33
Bank E	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.96	0.48	0.89	0.98	0.65	0.94
Bank F	0.40	0.17	1.00	0.40	0.50	0.40	0.40	0.26	0.57
Bank G	0.86	1.00	0.88	0.60	0.60	0.70	0.71	0.75	0.78
Average	0.47	0.52	0.70	0.39	0.31	0.34	0.41	0.36	0.42

irregularities. Hence, the classifier must have found that a combination of features that is characteristic for a bank that is facing liquidity stress.

## 6 Conclusions

We conclude that liquidity stress at banks can be reasonably well detected by supervised machine learning. Our best classifier generated alarms for liquidity stress with a precision of 70% and a recall of 34%. In some cases, the classifier identified signs of liquidity stress well before the stress was reported by financial newspapers. Most of these signs remained undetectable when studying simple plots of the features one-at-a-time. Although our method needs some further improvements to be used in practice, we believe that it is a promising new tool for central banks to monitor the financial activities of banks.

There are several ways in which our method can be improved. Our classifiers were trained on data of only seven banks. It is to be expected that the classifiers perform much better when they are trained on a larger dataset containing a more diverse set of stress

events. Moreover, the generation of the stress classes by our news analysis still involved a lot of manual work. Future research could investigate whether this step can be automated by applying techniques of natural language processing or sentiment analysis.

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


Figure 2: The out-of-sample predictions of MLP2 for bank E. The background colors highlight the stress codes that were assigned to the feature vectors of the bank by our news analysis. The classifier picks up an early-warning sign of liquidity stress in the 'Possibly Stress' period, quite some time before newspapers reported the stress in the 'Stress' period. Note that, because of confidentiality reasons, we were not allowed to include the original figure in this paper. This figure is artificially generated and closely resembles the original figure.

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