



# Loan guarantees, bank lending and credit risk reallocation

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## Questions and main findings

- **What drives the demand and supply of Covid-related loan guarantees?**
- **Have loan guarantees created new or substituted existing loans?**

## Questions and main findings

- **What drives the demand and supply of Covid-related loan guarantees?**
- **Have loan guarantees created new or substituted existing loans?**
- **These questions are being answered ...**
  - ... using AnaCredit data for 4 large Euro Area economies
  - ... for the period until August 2020
  - ... using the Khwaja and Mian (2008 AER) technology.

## Questions and main findings

- **What drives the demand and supply of Covid-related loan guarantees?**
  - Demand = small, creditworthy firms in sectors affected by the pandemic
  - Supply = large, liquid, well-capitalized banks
- **Have loan guarantees created new or substituted existing loans?**
  - Most guaranteed loans constituted additional lending – but a small, significant share substituted pre-existing loans.
  - Substitution was strongest for risky, small firms exposed to the pandemic, ...
  - ... and for borrowing from larger and stronger banks.


## Overall assessment and comments


- **This is a well-written, highly topical paper that uses state-of-the-art empirical techniques and data:**
  - I strongly recommend reading the paper!
- **My comments are related to the framing and the main narrative:**
  - Does the **type of shock** matter?
  - What has been the **purpose** of fiscal measures – and did they achieve the objective?
  - How to assess the **macroeconomic effects** of loan guarantees and other fiscal measures?
- **Covid-related fiscal measures targeted the real economy – and indirectly stabilized also the financial system.**
  - Future macroeconomic risks could be underestimated!

**CORONA SHOCK**



**Risk of a  
credit crunch**






# Fiscal measures during the pandemic reached up to 24% of GDP in terms of volume and 10% in terms of uptake.

▨ Total size announced (since 2020Q3)  
 ▨ Size announced 2021Q4  
 ▨ Size announced 2021Q3  
 ▨ Size announced 2021Q2  
■ of which: total uptake (since 2020Q3)  
 ■ of which: uptake 2021Q4  
 ■ of which: uptake 2021Q3  
 ■ of which: uptake 2021Q2

(% of 2019 GDP)



Source: Recommendation ESRB/2020/8, as of reference date 31/12/2021.



## Does the type of shock matter?

- **The Corona recession differed from previous recessions:**
    - Global, unexpected health shock
    - Little *ex ante* private sector insurance
    - Effects on advanced economies *and* emerging markets
    - Little risk of moral hazard
  - **There was a case for *ex post* insurance through fiscal policy:**
    - Coordinated global policy response
    - Coordinated policy response across fiscal, monetary, and regulatory policy (supervision, insolvency regulation)
- *Does the nature of the shock affect the results of this paper?*
- *Do results generalize beyond the special Covid-setting?*

# What has been the purpose of fiscal measures – and did they achieve the objective?

- **Loan guarantees have been used extensively across countries to prevent a credit crunch triggered by the pandemic.**
  - **Policymakers might pursue different goals:**
    - (Directly) stabilize the real economy and employment
    - (Indirectly) stabilize the financial sector
    - Prevent excessive corporate insolvencies
    - Promote specific sectors
  - **Finding evidence in favor or against substitution effects is one metric to analyze the effects (and side effects) of these programs.**
- *Are there other relevant metrics?*
- *Are there implications for future fiscal programs? What to monitor? Which information systems to establish?*

## How to assess the macroeconomic effects?

- **The micro-econometric technique used in this paper is highly effective in identifying causal effects.**
  - **But identification comes at the price of eliminating macroeconomic factors.**
    - Hence, the results do not tell us much about the aggregate effects of loan guarantees
  - **Many relevant policy questions center around aggregate effects:**
    - What are the implications of loan guarantees for employment?
    - What are the financial stability implications?
    - How do fiscal policy, monetary policy, and macroprudential measures interact?
- ***Which empirical tools can we use to answer these questions?***


# Has this time been different?

## Corporate insolvencies in Germany during post-war recessions.

### Gross domestic product and corporate insolvencies

Percentage changes during the respective recession

#### Corporate insolvencies




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# During the pandemic, vulnerabilities have continued to build up – the financial cycle has not been interrupted.

## Credit-to-GDP gap in selected advanced economies\*

Percentage points



Sources: BIS and Bundesbank calculations. \* Based on 27 advanced economies using classification by the IMF.

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