Over time, this is often followed by a phase in which wages do eventually adjust. Employees try to make up for the loss in purchasing power by negotiating higher wages. As a result, the contribution of wages to price trends increases, while the contribution of gross profits decreases. We also observed this shift in 2022 and beyond: initially, gross profits made a relatively large contribution to the GDP deflator, and subsequently this shifted to the contribution from wages.
Is such a shift happening again?
Not for the time being. Although energy prices have been rising again since February, recent GDP deflator figures for the first quarter of 2026 still show a slight fall. Consumer prices, too, have so far risen at a much slower rate than they did following the energy price shock in 2022. Furthermore, the contribution from gross profits and wages has remained virtually unchanged compared with the previous quarter. That is not surprising: experience from 2022 shows that these shifting effects often happen with a delay.
How does it end?
When wages rise, the costs for businesses also go up. If businesses pass on these costs in their prices, wage and price movements can reinforce each other. Economists refer to this as a wage-price spiral. An earlier DNB analysis shows that the interaction between wages and prices is limited, however. Higher prices do lead to higher wages in the long run, but higher wages are passed on to prices to a much lesser extent. As a result, the effect is not amplified indefinitely, but gradually fades away.
For central banks, the key considerations are whether the effect of rising prices will spread to an increasing number of goods and services and whether longer-term inflation expectations will increase. As long as households and businesses remain confident that inflation will eventually return to the target level, the risk of persistently high inflation remains limited.