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The impact of trustees' age and representation on strategic asset allocations

Working paper 698
Working Papers

Gepubliceerd: 01 december 2020

Door: Rob Bauer Rien Bogman Matteo Bonetti Dirk Broeders

A board of trustees has the fiduciary duty to invest a pension fund's assets in the best interest of its beneficiaries. Trustees'characteristics should not affect their investment decisions. We find two counterfactual artefacts for corporate pension funds. First, a higher average board age lowers the strategic allocation to equity by 7 percentage points after controlling for the pension fund's characteristics. This way the strategic asset allocation does not fully reflect the beneficiaries'characteristics. Second, pension funds with a greater representation of employers on the board allocate more to equities. This fosters a principal-agent problem between employer trustees and beneficiaries.

Keywords: Pension Funds; Asset Allocation; Pension Fund Governance; Agency Problems
JEL codes G11; G23

Working paper no. 698

698 The impact of trustees' age and representation on strategic asset allocations

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