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Transparency of banking supervisors

Working Papers

Following Eijffinger and Geraats (2006), we construct an index of transparency of banking supervisors that takes political, economic, procedural, policy and operational transparency into account. Based on a survey, we construct the index for 24 banking supervisors. There are large differences among transparency of supervisors. The average total score is 9.2 points (out of 15), whereas the minimum is 6.25 points and the maximum 12.75 points. The average of economic transparency is the highest, while the average score for policy transparency is the lowest. Our analysis suggests that it is very hard to identify factors that can explain these differences.

Key words: transparency, banking supervision.

JEL code: G28.

Working paper no. 297

297 - Transparency of banking supervisors

Download 297 - Transparency of banking supervisors

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