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04 december 2018 Onderzoek Toezichtlabel Working Papers

Forward Guidance and the Role of Central Bank Credibility

This paper studies the macroeconomic effects of central bank forward guidance when central bank credibility is endogenous. In particular, we take a stylized New Keynesian model with an occasionally binding zero lower bound constraint on nominal interest rates and heterogeneous and boundedly rational households. The central bank uses a bivariate VAR to forecast, not taking into account the time-variation in the distribution of aggregate expectations. In this framework, we extend the central bank's toolkit to allow for the publication of its own forecasts (Delphic guidance) and the commitment to a future path of the nominal interest rate (Odyssean guidance). We find that both Delphic and Odyssean forward guidance increase the likelihood of recovery from a liquidity trap. Even though Odyssean guidance alone appears more powerful, we find it to increase ex post macroeconomic volatility and thus reduce welfare.

Keywords: Forward Guidance, Heterogeneous Beliefs, Bounded Rationality, Central Bank Learning.  
JEL-classifications: E03, E12, E58.

Working paper no. 614

614 - Forward Guidance and the Role of Central Bank Credibility



  • Gavin Goy
  • Cars Hommes
  • Kostas Mavromatis